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Abstract
This Comment argues that the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias
should not be applied beyond cases involving persecution on account of political opinion. Part
I sets out the relevant statutes, treaties, and international documents that control U.S. asylum
law. Part II describes the majority and dissenting opinions in Elias-Zacarias. Part III analyzes
the Supreme Court’s decision in Elias-Zacarias and argues that the decision was misguided in its
approach. This Comment concludes that Elias-Zacarias should be limited in its future application
so that the United States can maintain its compliance with international treaty obligations.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER VICE v. ELIAS-
ZACARIAS: A DEPARTURE FROM THE PAST*
INTRODUCTION
In response to its obligations under international law,' the
United States enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 (the "Act" or
"Refugee Act") to consider applications for asylum.2 Under
the Act, the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to
aliens in the United States who reasonably fear persecution in
their homelands on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.3 Fed-
eral courts in the United States have differed as to the asylum
status of aliens punished in their homelands for refusal to
serve in military combat for reasons of political opinion or reli-
gion.4
* The author wishes to thank Arthur C. Helton, Director, Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, Refugee Project and Karen Musalo, Assistant Professor, Refugee/
Human Rights Clinic, University of San Fransisco Law School, for their assistance
and guidance.
1. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol or U.N. Protocol]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (defining
refugee); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) (establishing procedure for alien present in
United States to apply for asylum if alien meets definition of refugee).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A),
1158(a) (1988)).
3. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (defining refugees); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(granting discretion to Attorney General on decisions for refugee asylum). Under
the Act, the Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to those unable or
unwilling to return to their native country because of a "persecution or well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1101(a)(42)(A).
4. Compare Zacarias v. United States INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that forcible recruitment attempts constituted persecution on account of political
opinion), rev 'd sub nom INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); Canas-Segovia v.
INS, 902 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that punishment against Jehovah's
Witnesses who refuse to perform military service because their religion prohibits
such service constitutes persecution under Act), vacated and remanded, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir.
July 10, 1992) with M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 316 (4th Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding that punishment against political conscientious objector is not persecution
on account of political opinion because political opinion of neutrality not connected
to fears of persecution); Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990)
(finding that punishment for refusal to serve in Army may result in persecution on
account of political opinion); Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration,
894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11 th Cir. 1990) (requiring proof of persecutor's intent). The
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In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias,5
the U.S. Supreme Court drastically limited the ability of aliens
to obtain asylum in the United States based on political opin-
ion.' In Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") appealed from a decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.7 The Ninth Circuit had held
that an alien who desired to remain neutral in a civil war, refus-
ing to obey threats of guerrillas who had political motives, was
eligible for asylum based on political opinion.8 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the proper inquiry focuses on the
victim's political opinions, not the political opinions of the per-
secutor.9 Moreover, the Court stated that an asylum applicant
must provide some evidence of the persecutor's intent to per-
secute the alien on account of the alien's political opinion.10
This Comment argues that the standards enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias should not be applied be-
yond cases involving persecution on account of political opin-
ion. Part I sets out the relevant statutes, treaties, and interna-
tional documents that control U.S. asylum law. Part II de-
scribes the majority and dissenting opinions in Elias-Zacarias.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias
and argues that the decision was misguided in its approach.
This Comment concludes that Elias-Zacarias should be limited
in its future application so that the United States can maintain
its compliance with international treaty obligations.
I. ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY OF ALIENS
Under several U.N. agreements to which the United States
First Circuit has noted that in view of the conflict between Perlera-Escobar and Canas-
Segovia, the First and Eleventh Circuits "appear divided on the issue" whether "per-
secution on account of political neutrality requires that the intention of the persecutor
be the 'linch-pin' of the analysis." Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 8 n.6 (1st Cir.
1990) (emphasis in original).
5. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
6. Id.
7. See Zacarias v. United States INS, 921 F.2d 844 (1990), rev'd sub nom INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
8. Id.
9. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
10. Id. at 817. The Court also held that in order to obtain ajudicial reversal of a
holding by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), the applicant must show that
"the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail
to find the requisite fear of persecution." Id.
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is a signatory, the United States has an obligation to provide
refuge to aliens who face persecution in their native lands."
To comply with U.S. international obligations, the U.S. Con-
gress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 that allows aliens to re-
main in the United States if they face persecution on account
of political opinion or religion upon return to their home-
land. 12 U.S. courts have disagreed, however, concerning the
statute's application to aliens who oppose military service be-
cause of their religion or political opinion. 1
A. International Obligations to Asylum Applicants
After the Second World War, the international community
ended the use of ad hoc agreements to settle specific refugee
issues. 14 As part of this effort, numerous nations ratified the
1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization
("IRO"), which defined "refugees" as those people who could
not return to their homelands due to a reasonable fear of per-
secution based on several factors, including political opinion
and religion.' 5 The IRO manual, used by those determining
11. See supra note 1 (identifying U.N. treaties); see also infra notes 14-23 and ac-
companying text (describing U.N. treaties).
12. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A),
1158(a) (1988)); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 19 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160; see also S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1979),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme
Court, explaining Congress' intent, asserted that "[i]f one thing is clear from the
legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980 Act,
it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol ...." 480 U.S. 421, 436
(1987); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 (declaring that treaties are part of "supreme
law of the land"); see also Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (explaining that statutes "ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains").
13. See supra note 4 (explaining prior split in circuit courts over persecution for
failure to serve in military).
14. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. I (A)(1), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152. The
agreements include the Arrangements of May 12, 1926 and June 30, 1928; the Con-
ventions of October 28, 1933 and February 10, 1938; the Protocol of September 14,
1939; and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization. Id. See OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 32 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. HANDBOOK] (describing various international agreements existing prior to
1951 that defined refugees).
15. See IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § Cl(a)(i), 62 Stat. 3037. According to
the IRO Constitution, a "refugee" is defined as a person who had a "valid objection"
to returning to his homeland; the IRO Constitution also specified that "fear based on
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asylum eligibility, explained that the applicant need only make
a reasonable argument that the applicant fears persecution be-
cause of religion or political beliefs; the intent of the persecu-
tor was not described as controlling. 6
In 1951, the United Nations incorporated the IRO defini-
tion of "refugee" into the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("1951 Convention" or the "Convention") so that
the international community would have a general definition of
"refugee" to follow.' 7 The 1951 Convention defined refugees
as those who could not return to their homeland "owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of [five fac-
tors, including religion and political opinion].' 8 The Conven-
tion prohibited nations from returning such victims of persecu-
tion to their homelands.' 9 Despite its broad language, the
1951 Convention limited signatory nations' obligations to ref-
ugee situations that were known to exist at that time or that
might arise later from events that had already occurred.20
reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions" was a valid objection. Id; see Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437.
16. International Refugee Organization, MANUAL FOR ELIGIBILITY OFFICERS 24,
ch. IV, 19 (undated, circulated in 1950) [hereinafter IRO MANUAL, quoted in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 n.20 (1987). The IRO Manual explains that
fear of persecution is to be regarded as a valid objection whenever an appli-
cant can make plausible that owing to his religious or political convictions or
to his race, he is afraid of discrimination, or persecution, on returning
home. Reasonable grounds are to be understood as meaning that the appli-
cant can give a plausible and coherent account of why he fears persecution.
Since fear is a subjective feeling, the Eligibility Officer cannot refuse to con-
sider the objection as valid when it is plausible.
Id.; see Theodore N. Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted": The Sources and Appli-
cation of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOK. J. INr'L L. 333, 340 (1984).
17. 1951 Convention, supra note l,July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1987) (explaining how 1951 Conven-
tion adopted IRO definition of refugee).
18. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, (A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The
1951 Convention explained that refugees are those "owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country." Id.
19. See, e.g., 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, T.I.A.S. No.
6577. Article 33 sets forth the obligations of nations not to a return a refugee to a
country in which the refugee's "life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." Id.
20. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 7.
INS v. ELIAS-ZACARIAS
As additional refugee situations arose, however, the
United Nations expanded the rules promulgated by the 1951
Convention so that the grounds for asylum would also include
future events.2  Therefore, the U.N. created the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol" or "U.N.
Protocol"), utilizing the "well-founded fear" test from the
1951 Convention.22 As a result, both the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol are the definitive multilateral treaties
that provide the internationally accepted definition of refugee
and set forth the rights of persons who meet the definition.2 3
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not spe-
cifically address the refugee status of those who face punish-
ment for their refusal to serve in the military for reasons of
religion or political opinion. The U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, however, provides guidance through its Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ("U.N. Hand-
book" or "Handbook").2 4 The U.N. Handbook acknowledges that
nations are free to punish draft resisters and evaders.25 The
U.N. Handbook recognizes, however, that "disproportionately
severe punishment" on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
21. Id. 9.
22. 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577; see INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 (1987) (stating that 1967 Protocol incorpo-
rated 1951 Convention definition of refugee without modification).
23. SeeJ. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS V (1991). The United States
acceded to the Protocol in 1968.
24. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 7 164-74; see Statute of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 Annex 46, at 46, 1, U.N. Doc. A/428 (1950). The Statute of
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner explains that the High Commissioner shall
provide protection for refugees by "[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of
international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their applica-
tion and proposing amendments thereto." Id. $ 8(a).
25. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 167. The U.N. Handbook explains that
[i]n countries where military service is compulsory, failure to perform this
duty is frequently punishable by law. Moreover, whether military service is
compulsory or not, desertion is invariably considered a criminal offence.
The penalties may vary from country to country, and are not normally re-
garded as persecution. Fear of persecution and punishment for desertion
does not in itself constitute well-founded fear of persecution under the defi-
nition.
Id.; see id. 168 (explaining that "[a] person is clearly not a refugee if his only reason
for desertion of draft-evasion is his dislike of military service or fear of combat").
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may qualify an individual as a "refugee." 2 6
In addition, the U.N. Handbook contains provisions regard-
ing people who object to military service on the basis of polit-
ical convictions, religious or moral convictions, or "valid rea-
sons of conscience.12 7 First, the U.N. Handbook grants individ-
ual nations the discretion to grant asylum to political
conscientious objectors who oppose all military service.28
Although not defined in the U.N. Handbook, conscientious ob-
jectors are generally considered to be those who oppose par-
ticipation in war due to a sincerely held belief.29 Second, the
U.N. Handbook requires nations to grant asylum to aliens who
disagree with their homeland's government on political
grounds regarding a particular military action only if the inter-
national community considers that military action to be con-
trary to the basic rules of human conduct.3 ° Finally, the U.N.
Handbook mandates that governments must grant asylum to
aliens who refuse to serve in the military due to religious be-
liefs if the applicants are able to show that their beliefs are gen-
uine and that the native country fails to take these beliefs into
account when requiring military service." Several nations, in-
26. Id. 169.
27. Id. 170.
28. Id. 171. The U.N. Handbook explains that "[n]ot every conviction, genuine
though it may be, will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after
desertion or draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in disagreement with
his government regarding the political justification for a particular military action."
Id.; see id. 173 (explaining that "an increasing number" of countries have legislation
or administrative policies that allow such alternative service for conscientious objec-
tors).
29. See Karen Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide
Refuge to Young Men who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 849, 850 n.9 (1989); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 304 (6th ed. 1990).
30. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 171. The U.N. Handbook explains that
[iut is not enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government
regarding the political justification for a particular military action. Where,
however, the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish
to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary
to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion
could ... in itself be regarded as persecution.
Id.
31. Id. at 40, 172 (explaining that "[i]f an applicant is able to show that his
religious convictions are genuine, and that such convictions are not taken into ac-
count by the authorities of his country in requiring him to perform his military ser-
vice, he may be able to establish a claim to refugee status").
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cluding Germany,3 2 the Netherlands, 33 Canada, 34 and Aus-
32. See Brief of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights & American Jewish Com-
mittee as Amid Curiae at 12, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342)
(Arthur C. Helton, Attorney of Record) (citing Decision of the German Federal Ad-
ministrative Court, Berlin, BVerwGE IC 41.60 Uune 29, 1962)). The German admin-
istrative court granted refugee status to a member of a Nazarene sect who had been
sentenced to a long term of forced labor for refusal to perform military service be-
cause the punishment amounted to persecution on account of religion. Id. The
court explained that
[the applicant] was involved in a conflict between two duties: on the one
hand, the State required him to perform military service; on the other hand,
his religion required him to refrain from such service for reasons of con-
science. If the State takes action against the person involved in such a con-
flict, the effect as far as he is concerned is persecution because of his reli-
gion.
Id. The Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach, has also recognized that a refusal
to serve in the military can support an asylum claim when evidence indicates that the
government will punish the applicant for suspicion of political opposition. See Brief
of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights & American Jewish Committee as Amici
Curiae at 18, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342) (Arthur C.
Helton, Attorney of Record) (citing BVerwG (An 19 K 87.35820) (June 23, 1988).
33. See Respondents' Brief in Opposition to a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
13, INS v. Canas-Segovia, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992) (No. 90-1246)
(Karen Musalo, Attorney of Record) (citing Decision of the Netherlands Council of
State, Ref. LP 80/68 - EG/GRE, 14.3.1980 (granting asylum because of persecution
on account of religion to pacifist who faced prison term of over two years for refusal
to serve in military)), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir.July 10, 1992).
34. See Brief of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights & American Jewish Com-
mittee as Amici Curiae at 9, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342)
(Arthur C. Helton, Attorney of Record) (citing Ramirez, Louis Alberto Mena v. Min-
ister of Employment and Immigration, IAB No. 86-6161 at 4 (May 5, 1987) (granting
refugee status after finding persecution on account of religion when Jehovah's Wit-
ness feared forced induction and death for refusal to comply)). The court explained
that
[iut matters little that [the applicant] is subjected to the same conscription
law or practices as other young men of military age who are without such
[beliefs]; the issue is not equal treatment, but fear of persecution .... Were
[the applicant] required to enter the military and undertake military duties
which would deeply offend his sensibilities, he would, in the Board's opin-
ion, be suffering persecution .... It is the failure of the recruiting system to
make allowances for the convictions of the conscientious objector that forms
the basis of the fear.
Id.; see Brief of Amici Curiae at 14, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (citing Jorge Ardon
Abarca v. Ministry of Employment and Immigration, IAB No. W86-4030-W (Mar. 21,
1986)). In Ardon Abarca, the Canadian Board of Immigration Appeals held that an
asylum applicant who refused to report for military duty due to human rights viola-
tions by the El Salvadoran army was eligible for asylum. Id. The court explained that
the applicant's refusal to serve in the military was "perceived as a serious or threaten-
ing act of political opposition to the system as a whole." Id.; see R.G.L. Fairweather,
Temporary Sanctuary Tends to Get Permanent; Political Persecution, Mar. 7, 1992, Letter to
the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, at A24 (explaining that Canadian courts and immigration
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tria,3 5 follow the U.N. Handbook's approach for asylum appli-
cants who refuse to serve in the military because of political
opinion or religion.
B. U.S. Statutory Approach to Asylum
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 to bring the
United States into compliance with the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol.36 Under the Refugee Act, the Attorney
General has discretion to grant asylum to aliens who satisfy the
statutory definition of a refugee.37 The Act protects aliens who
are unable or unwilling to return to their native countries due
to "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion.1' 38 This definition of refugee
mirrors the definition of refugee used in the 1951 Convention
and the U.N. Protocol.3 9 Therefore, when U.S. courts examine
officials have followed majority of nations that hold that refusal to join guerrilla orga-
nizations is expression of political opinion).
35. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 14, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (citing Federal
Ministry of the Interior Regulation No. 22.501/4/-II/C/75 (June 4, 1975) (interpret-
ing Austrian Asylum Law of 1968 to hold that individual is eligible for asylum when
refusing to serve in military for one of reasons in 1951 Convention if there is no
alternative military service permitted)); see also Respondents' Brief in Opposition to a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, INS v. Canas-Segovia, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1992) (No. 90-1246) (Karen Musalo, Attorney of Record) (citing Minis-
terial Directive ("Erlas") of Austria ofJune 4, 1975, No. 22.01/4-11/0/75 (recogniz-
ing asylum for conscientious objectors)), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505
(9th Cir. July 10, 1992)).
36. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A),
1158(a) (1988); see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress
passed Refugee Act to comply with international obligations).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (explain-
ing U.S. requirements for asylum under Refugee Act of 1980).
38. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (1988). At the beginning of 1992, more
than 100,000 petitions for political asylum were pending with the INS. Tamar Lewin,
Supreme Court Case May Determine Fate of Thousands Seeking Asylum, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3,
1992, at A28.
39. Compare 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. I(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S 150, 152
(defining refugee as person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of ... religion ... or political opinion" is unable to return to homeland)
with 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1988) (defining refugee as one outside native country
who is unable or unwilling to return because of "persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of... religion.., or political opinion"). The 1967 Proto-
col incorporated the 1951 definition, but expanded its use by removing previous lim-
its on its application. 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, at 6225; see HATHAWAY, supra note
23, at 10.
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the Refugee Act, they utilize the U.N. Protocol as the interna-
tional source of U.S. asylum law.4" When courts interpret the
Refugee Act and need more guidance than the 1967 Protocol
provides, Congress most likely intended that they use the U.N.
High Commissioner's Handbook.4 U.S. courts have generally
followed congressional intent and used the U.N. Handbook for
guidance in interpreting the proper meaning of the U.N. Pro-
tocol.
4 2
The Supreme Court, after interpreting the 1951 Conven-
tion, the 1967 Protocol, and the U.N. Handbook, set out the
standard for a "well-founded fear of persecution" in Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca.43 In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court stated that applicants must demonstrate that
they have both a subjective fear of persecution and that their
fear is objectively reasonable.4 4 A showing that the fear is
"genuine" satisfies the subjective component.45 To satisfy the
40. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (explaining that
Congress intended U.S. asylum law to conform to Protocol).
41. See U.S. Refugee Program: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
24, 26 (1981) (Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to David Crossland, General Counsel, INS) (explaining that
"[w]e assume that Congress was aware of the criteria articulated in the Handbook
when it passed the Refugee Act of 1980, and that it is appropriate to consider the
guidelines in the Handbook as an aid to construction of the Act"); see, e.g., Damaize-
Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 161); see also U.N.
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 169-74.
42. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987). The Court
has stated that "the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Proto-
col, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in
giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes." Id. (citing McCullen
v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)); see, e.g., Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638,
642 n.l (7th Cir. 1991); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985). But
see United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that U.N.
Handbook does not serve as binding law).
43. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-
25 (1984)); Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 848
F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988).
44. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 434. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court examined the
asylum eligibility of a Nicaraguan native whose brother had been tortured and im-
prisoned because of his political activities in Nicaragua. Id. at 424. After the alien
and her brother fled together, the alien feared that she would be held responsible for
her brother's activities even though she was not politically active. Id. at 424-25.
45. Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Diaz-
Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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objective component, the applicant must demonstrate an ob-
jectively reasonable possibility of persecution.46 The applicant
can demonstrate this objective element of the "well-founded
fear" standard even if the chances are slight that the persecu-
tion will actually occur.4 7
C. U.S. Judicial Approach to Asylum
Due to Cardoza-Fonseca's requirement that asylum appli-
cants demonstrate the subjective and objective nature of their
fear, applicants who face punishment for refusing to serve in
the military for reasons of political opinion or religion may
have difficulty proving that they are entitled to asylum. Under
the U.N. Handbook, aliens claiming persecution on account of
religion must demonstrate that they have genuine religious be-
liefs that the persecutor fails to consider when requiring mili-
tary service. 4' Aliens who claim persecution because they are
political conscientious objectors are entitled to asylum only at
the discretion of individual nations. 49 Aliens who claim perse-
cution because they possess a political opinion of neutrality
must show that they oppose conduct which the international
community has condemned.5" Moreover, most courts do not
grant asylum based on neutrality unless the applicant can
prove that the political opinion of neutrality has been affirma-
tively expressed.5 '
46. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
47. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). The Court indicated
that even a 10% chance of persecution would create a well-founded fear. Id. at 431
(quoting 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180
(1966)). The standard of proof required in asylum cases is less stringent than that
required in other contexts under U.S. immigration law. Compare INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984) (explaining that aliens seeking withholding of deportation
must prove it is "more likely than not" that they will face persecution if returned) with
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449-50 (1987) (rejecting "more likely than not" standard
of proof for asylum cases as contrary to congressional intent).
48. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text (explaining approach to cases of
asylum applicant claiming persecution on account of religion).
49. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (explaining approach to cases
involving persecution involving conscientious objection).
50. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text (describing proof require-
ments for refugees claiming persecution for political opinion of neutrality).
51. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text (describing proof require-
ments for refugees claiming persecution for political opinion of neutrality).
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1. Persecution on Account of Religion
Aliens may seek asylum in the United States when their
religion prohibits them from engaging in violence yet their
country threatens to punish them if they refuse to serve in the
military.52 These asylum applicants satisfy the Act's definition
of "persecution on account of ... religion" if attempts to con-
script them continue despite awareness of their religiously-
based opposition to military service. 55  As the U.N. Handbook
explains, these applicants need only show that their beliefs
were not taken into account by the persecutor when the perse-
cutor required the military service.54
Only one U.S. Court of Appeals case has involved perse-
cution on account of religion in the context of forced military
recruitment. 55 In Canas-Segovia v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 56 two brothers illegally entered the United States from
El Salvador because their native country mandated military
service. The brothers argued that, as Jehovah's Witnesses,
the tenets of their religion prohibited them from participating
in any kind of military service.5 8 The brothers submitted ex-
tensive evidence of the various extrajudicial penalties, such as
torture and murder, that they expected to face if they refused
to serve in the military.59
Prior to Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
52. See, e.g., Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and
remanded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
53. See, e.g., Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1990).
54. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 172 ; see supra note 34 (explaining U.N.
Handbook's approach to refusal to serve in military for religious reasons).
55. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded,
1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505
(9th Cir. July 10, 1992). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Canas-Segovia for reconsideration in light of Elias-Zacarias. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 720. In El Salvador, military service is required for all males between
the ages of 18 and 30; there are no exemptions for any conscientious grounds and no
alternatives to military service. Id. The penalty for resisting conscription is impris-
onment for a period ranging from six months to 15 years. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. One brother testified that a friend was taken away and never seen again
for refusing to serve in the military. Id. An affidavit submitted at trial described how
army officials chopped off the arms of a deserter. Id. Other affidavits explained how
"[tihose who refuse to join the armed forces for reasons of conscience are tortured
and killed." Id.
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Ninth Circuit had held that aliens who face punishment for re-
fusal to perform military service, based on religious grounds,
have met the prima facie requirement of a "well-founded fear
of persecution. ' 60 The court explained that punishment for a
refusal to perform military service is persecution "if the refusal
is based upon genuine political, religious, or moral convic-
tions, or other genuine reasons of conscience."'" The court
rejected claims that a facially neutral conscription policy is not
per se persecution. 62 The court, analogizing to U.S. constitu-
tional law on freedom of religion, explained that facially neu-
tral laws may impermissibly infringe upon individuals' First
Amendment rights.63
The court in Canas-Segovia analyzed the asylum statute it-
self and looked to the U.N. Handbook and congressional intent
for guidance.' The court found evidence to support the claim
that conscientious objectors have met the "well-founded fear
of persecution" test.65 The Ninth Circuit focused on the U.N.
Handbook and quoted the language requiring countries to
"take[ ] into account" the religious convictions of its citizens
when setting military conscription policy.66 Moreover, the
court found that the asylum applicants in this case had suffered
"disproportionately greater punishment" because service in
60. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and re-
manded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
61. Id. at 726.
62. Id. at 723.
63. Id. at 723-24. The court relied on several cases: Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981) (finding that Jehovah's Witness who left weapons factory was entitled
to employment benefits when after leaving job for religious reasons); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (explaining that "a regulation neutral upon its face
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement of govern-
ment neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion"); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 965 (1963) (holding that Seventh Day Adventist whose religion pre-
vented work on Saturday cannot be barred from receiving employment benefits). But
see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (holding that generally applicable
criminal law against peyote use which incidentally burdens free exercise of religion
by Native Americans using ceremonial peyote is acceptable), reh 'g denied, 496 U.S. 913
(1990); H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing legislation to overturn
the decision in Smith); see also 137 CONG. REC. 101 (1991).
64. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 724 & n. 13 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and
remanded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
65. Id. at 725.
66. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d 717, 725; see U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 171.
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the military causes such people to choose between sacrificing
their religious beliefs or facing punishment for failure to serve
in the military. 67 The court rejected arguments that the Refu-
gee Act requires applicants for asylum to demonstrate the per-
secutor's motive or intent to persecute. 68 It explained that the
relevant standard examines only the asylum applicant's fear of
persecution and the reasonableness of that fear.69 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the applicants were eligible for asylum
because it was reasonable for aliens to believe that punishment
for refusal to serve in the military was on account of their reli-
gious beliefs. 70 The court also rested its decision on the alter-
native theory that the guerillas had mistakenly believed that
the Canas-Segovias possessed a political opinion opposed to
the anti-government forces and punished the brothers because
of this imputed political opinion.7 '
The Supreme Court later vacated the decision in Canas-
Segovia and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for recon-
sideration in light of Elias-Zacarias.72 On remand, the Ninth
Circuit found that it could not grant asylum on the basis of
religious persecution because the applicant had not provided
evidence of the persecutors' intent as Elias-Zacarias required.73
67. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d at 728.
68. Id. at 726-27.
69. Id. at 726. The court explained that
[n]either of these standards requires an asylum applicant to establish the
persecutor's intent or motive. Intent or motive to persecute is merely one
relevant consideration in the analysis of an asylum claim .... Bona fide
refugees already face logistical problems in gathering evidence due to their
being outside the country where the alleged persecution occurred .... Evi-
dence of proof of intent and motive would be particularly hard to provide
because both involve proof of a persecutor's state of mind.
Id. at 726, 727 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 727; see Musalo, supra note 28 (explaining arguments that attorney for
asylum applicants in Canas-Segovia made to Ninth Circuit). The Ninth Circuit
adopted much of Musalo's analysis. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir.
1990), vacated and remanded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
71. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d at 728-29.
72. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded,
1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505
(9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
73. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505, at *2 (9th Cir.July 10,
1992). The Ninth Circuit found that "[b]ecause the key 'on account of' language
applies equally to religious and political persecution, Elias-Zacarias dictates that
Canas-Segovia must show some evidence of his persecutor's intent, which he is un-
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The court granted asylum, however, on the alternative theory
that Mr. Canas-Segovia faced intentional persecution based on
a political opinion falsely attributed to him. 4
2. Persecution on Account of Political Opinion
The Refugee Act also provides asylum for those who are
persecuted on account of a political opinion. In cases that
clearly fall under the statute, asylum applicants will claim that
someone, usually the government, is intentionally punishing
them for having a particular political opinion. 76 The alien may
be eligible for asylum if the alien has expressed an opinion, if
the persecutor has imputed an opinion to the alien, or if it is
likely that the alien will express an opinion in the future.77
Aliens have two grounds under political opinion on which
to seek asylum based on their refusal to perform military ser-
vice. First, asylum applicants may be conscientious objectors
who claim persecution when forced to perform military service
despite their political opinion of opposition to all warfare.
Second, asylum applicants may possess a political opinion of
neutrality in a particular military action so that they face perse-
cution for refusal to serve in the military during a particular
civil war.
a. Political Conscientious Objection
Applicants who oppose all military activity for reasons of
conscience are entitled to asylum under the U.N. Handbook
able to do." Id. The court did not consider the application of Oscar Canas-Segovia
because he had married a U.S. citizen, thus rendering his asylum application moot.
Id. at *1.
74. Id. at *4-5. The Ninth Circuit stated that:
[i]mputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after Elias-Zacarias.
The Court made clear that evidence of motive is required, but imputed
political opinion, by definition, includes an element of motive. A persecutor
falsely attributes an opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim
because of that mistaken belief about the victim's views.
Id. at *5.
75. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (1988).
76. See In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985); In re Diaz, 10 1 & N 199,
204 (BIA 1963).
77. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1990); Lazo-
Manjano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
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only at the individual discretion of each nation. 8 Most courts
have held that aliens who fear punishment due to a refusal to
serve in the military on the basis of political conscientious ob-
jection are not entitled to asylum.79 Courts are hesitant to
grant asylum to such conscientious objectors for two reasons.
First, under the U.N. Handbook political conscientious objectors
opposed to military service are entitled to asylum only at the
discretion of individual nations while those aliens opposing all
military service on religious grounds need only show that their
religious beliefs were not taken into account.80 Second, in
such situations there is a strong underlying policy of interna-
tional law that nations have the right to enforce conscription
laws.8 ' For example, in M.A. A26851062 v. United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service,8 2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that an El Salvadoran alien failed to
make a prima facie case for asylum eligibility based on his re-
fusal to serve in the El Salvadoran military.8 3 The applicant for
asylum claimed that he objected to service in the military be-
cause of the various atrocities perpetrated by the El Salvadoran
army.8 4
The Fourth Circuit rejected the applicant's claim that his
political objection to atrocities by the military should be
grounds for asylum eligibility.8 5 The court found that the asy-
78. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, $ 173; see also supra text accompanying
note 29 (defining "conscientious objection").
79. See, e.g., Khalafv. INS, 909 F.2d 589, 591-92 (1st Cir. 1990); Kaveh-Haghigy
v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986); see also INS Basic Law Manual: Asylum
Summary and Overview (March 1991), at 43.
80. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 167-74.
81. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing right of nations to form
military and punish draft-evaders); see also M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 305, 312
(4th Cir. 1990).
82. M.A. A26851062 v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990)
83. 899 F.2d at 304.
84. Id. at 306. The applicant requested asylum after he first agreed to leave
voluntarily; the day before return to El Salvador he sought to reopen the deportation
proceedings. Id. The applicant witnessed "systematic and widespread" human
rights violations; he saw violence throughout his neighborhood and visited a morgue
where he saw "mutilated, decapitated, bruised, and gunned bodies." Id. In addition,
he felt that if he were to return to El Salvador and refuse to fight, he would be tor-
tured and killed as an opposition sympathizer. Id.
85. Id. at 306. The court reviewed the BIA decision to deny reopening of the
proceedings with "extreme deference" because the Refugee Act does not contem-
plate reopening and because the Attorney General's regulations disfavor motions to
reopen. Id. at 308; see id. at 307 (explaining that Attorney General established proce-
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lum applicant in this case was merely a "draft resister. ' 86 The
court emphasized that the U.N. Handbook, international law
and Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") precedent clearly
state that sovereign nations have the right to enforce their laws
of conscription and that penalties for failure to serve are not
persecution.8 7
b. Political Neutrality
In addition to persecution based on opposition to a partic-
ular military action for reasons of political conscience, aliens
may also claim persecution on account of political opinion
when they remain neutral in a civil conflict."' In such cases,
the opinion is not necessarily stated but the persecutors punish
the alien because they perceive the applicant's neutrality as a
political opinion in opposition to the persecutor's cause.8 9
When such aliens attempt to gain asylum under the Refugee
Act for their opinion of neutrality in a particular military ac-
tion, they face two obstacles. First, under the U.N. Handbook,
aliens objecting to a particular military action on political
grounds must show that the action is condemned by the inter-
national community as contrary to the basic rules of human
conduct. 90 Second, aliens often must demonstrate that they
actually articulated their opinion of neutrality in their home-
land. 9'
Only the Ninth Circuit has granted asylum to those who
dures for reopening of asylum cases under discretion granted by Refugee Act) (citing
INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985)).
86. Id. at 312.
87. M.A. A26851062 v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
U.N. Handbook, supra note 14, $ 167). Although the court recognized that some aliens
claiming persecution on the basis of political opinion may be eligible for asylum, the
court applied the U.N. Handbook's standards for aliens who oppose a particular mili-
tary action, rather than those who oppose warfare in general. Id. The court in M.A.
found that the alien did not meet the specific requirements of the U.N. Handbook
because the type of military action was not "condemned by the international commu-
nity as contrary to basic rules of human conduct." Id. (finding that applicant did not
meet exceptions set out in paragraph 169 or paragraph 171 of U.N. Handbook).
88. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 1000 (describing alien's fear that guerrillas would kill him due to his
neutrality).
90. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 171.
91. See Perlera-Escobar v. INS, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (11 th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that allowing such applicants to gain asylum would "create a sinkhole that would
swallow the rule").
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claim that their neutrality is a political opinion for which they
are being persecuted.92 Beyond the Ninth Circuit, some cir-
cuits have found that neutrality can be a political opinion, but
have not granted asylum in those cases.9" Moreover, even the
Ninth Circuit has recently limited its acceptance of neutrality
as political opinion.94
For example, in Arriaga-Barrientos v. United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service,95 an alien sought asylum when
discharged from the Guatemalan military after serving for 12
years.9 6 He believed that his discharge, although admittedly in
the normal course of service, would be construed as an act
sympathetic to the opposition.9 7 On the other hand, he feared
that his long military tenure would be construed by the guerril-
las as a sign of political support for the government. 98
Although he suggested that others had been killed by the op-
position after serving in the government's military, the alien
had not been threatened by the guerrillas or the government. 99
Two of the alien's brothers, however, had been kidnapped by
unknown gunmen.100
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
arguments that the alien faced persecution on account of a
political opinion of neutrality.' 0 ' The court acknowledged that
the Ninth Circuit, unlike most others, considers political neu-
trality to be a political opinion even if the asylum applicant has
not articulated an opinion of neutrality.10 2 However, the court
found that the asylum applicant had not proven the existence
92. See Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989); Turcios v.
INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277,
1286 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. See Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990); M.A. A26851062 v.
INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990).
94. See, e.g., Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991);
Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
95. 937 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 412.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Although the applicant suggested that the opposition had killed others
upon the completion of their military service for the government, he could not recall
specific instances of such persecution. Id.
100. Arriaga-Barrientos v. United States INS, 937 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991). The
opinion does not explain whether the brothers were killed or later found. Id.
101. Id. at 414.
102. Id. at 413.
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of any political opinion because the applicant failed to show
that the military or the guerrillas would impute an opinion of
neutrality to him.1 03 Because the applicant did not prove that
he had possessed an opinion or that others would impute an
opinion to him, the court found that the applicant had not sat-
isfied the requirements of the Refugee Act.
10 4
II. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v.
ELIAS-ZACARIAS
Faced with a variety of political conscientious objection
cases based on different situations and the religious conscien-
tious objection case of Canas-Segovia, the U.S. Supreme Court
chose to address the application of the Refugee Act to an asy-
lum applicant's objection to military service first in Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias.'05 In Elias-Zacarias,
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a gue-
rilla organization's attempts to coerce a person into perform-
ing military service constituted persecution "on account of...
political opinion" under the Refugee Act of 1980.106 The
Court held that resisting recruitment efforts of a guerilla or-
ganization does not necessarily qualify an alien as a "refu-
gee."' 7 The Court stated that it is not enough to remain neu-
tral by resisting the conscription efforts of military persecutors
with political motivations.' 0 8 Rather, the persecution must be
on account of the victim's expressed political opinion, not the
persecutor's.' ° 9 Moreover, an asylum applicant must provide
some evidence of the persecutor's motives." 0
103. Id. at 414. The court explained that
[h]e has not publicly articulated his political neutrality. He has not even
engaged in activities whose content is arguably political; in a country with
mandatory conscription, of course his mere accedence to military service is
not a political statement. Because he has not shown the existence of a polit-
ical opinion, we need not consider whether he has demonstrated a reason-
able fear of persecution because of his opinion.
Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 816.
109. Id.
110. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992).
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A. Procedural History
In Elias-Zacarias, the asylum applicant fled Guatemala be-
cause he feared reprisal for his refusal to join armed anti-gov-
ernment guerrillas."'I Mr. Elias-Zacarias did not want to align
himself against the government, but he feared the guerrillas
would kidnap or kill him if he refused them." 2 Two months
later, Mr. Elias-Zacarias fled Guatemala and entered the
United States, where he was apprehended by the INS." 3 Mr.
Elias-Zacarias applied for asylum, but an Immigration Judge
denied the application." 4 The BIA summarily dismissed his
appeal on procedural grounds and denied a subsequent mo-
tion for reconsideration. "15 Although the BIA also dismissed a
motion to reopen the case based on new evidence, it simulta-
neously addressed the merits of the appeal." 6 The court con-
cluded that there was no proof of persecution and denied the
petition for asylum." 7
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Guatemalan
guerrillas' forcible recruitment attempts constituted persecu-
111. See Zacarias v. United States INS, 921 F.2d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that forcible recruitment attempts constituted persecution on account of political
opinion), rev'd sub nom INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). Elias-Zacarias
testified that two uniformed guerrillas, carrying machine guns and wearing
handkerchiefs to conceal their faces, approached Elias-Zacarias' home. Id. at 847.
They attempted to persuade Elias-Zacarias to join their forces. Id. When he refused,
they told him to "think it [over] well" and said that they would be back. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. At the deportation hearing, the INS argued that Elias-Zacarias had
failed to show a "well-founded fear of persecution" because the guerrillas did not
specifically threaten him and because the guerrillas did not return to his home. See
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 13a, INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). However, the immigration judge found that
Zacarias' experience was not different than that of other Guatemalans and that he
failed to show the guerrillas would seek him out. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at
41a-42a, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
115. See Zacarias v. United States INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990)
(describing BIA decision); see also In re Zacarias, BIA unpublished dec. File No. A27
926 183 (Nov. 18, 1988) (explaining that BIA dismissed applicant's appeal because
counsel failed to file brief or statement on applicant's behalf specifying reasons for
appeal).
116. See In re Zacarias, No. A27 926 183 (BIA Nov. 18, 1988) (explaining that
new evidence consisted of letter from applicant's father, affidavit from counsel, and
affidavit from another attorney).
117. See id. (explaining that applicant's fear was "speculative" because guerrillas
did not threaten applicant).
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tion on account of political opinion." 18 The court found that it
was reasonable for Mr. Elias-Zacarias to believe that he had
been threatened on account of his expression of a political
opinion because he was hostile to the persecutor and the per-
secutor's motives in kidnapping him were political.' t'
B. The Supreme Court's Holding
In Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court succinctly held that
the guerilla group's attempts to force Mr. Elias-Zacarias into
military service did not constitute persecution under the Refu-
gee Act.' 2 ' The Court focused on the plain meaning of the
Refugee Act. 12 ' Although the Ninth Circuit had found "perse-
cution on account of... political opinion" because the asylum
applicant had resisted the recruitment efforts of those with
political motives, 22 the Supreme Court explained that the
proper inquiry under the "ordinary meaning" of the statute
was to focus on the victim's political opinion, not that of the
persecutor. 23 After a cursory examination of the statutory
language, the Court reached a number of conclusions.'
24
First, the Court found that punishment for refusal to serve
in the military on account of a political opinion of neutrality
would not necessarily be grounds for asylum if the applicant
118. Zacarias v. United States INS, 921 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
nom INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). The court explained that "the per-
son resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the perse-
cutor." Id. The court added that "the persecutor's motive in carrying out the kid-
napping is political." Id.
119. Id. at 852. The court explained that "[thle fact that the guerrillas engaged
in forced recruitment is proof that they had the will to persecute [Zacarias]." Id. The
court added that "the threat to [Zacarias] was for political as opposed to personal
reasons .... There was no evidence to rebut the common sense inference that the
guerrillas were interested in recruiting [Zacarias] to further the group's political
goals." Id. (emphasis in original).
120. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
121. Id. at 816 (opining that "[ifn construing statutes, 'we must, of course, start
with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary mean-
ing of the words used' ") (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the 6-3 majority opinion. Id. at 814.
122. Zacarias v. U.S. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
123. Elias-Zacatias, 112 S. Ct. at 816 (providing example that "if a fundamental-
ist Moslem regime peisecutes democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on ac-
count of religion").
124. Id. at 816-17. The majority's opinion covered less than three pages.
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had not affirmatively expressed an opinion back in his home-
land.' 2 5 The Court rejected arguments that Mr. Elias-Zacarias'
decision to remain neutral in the fight between the govern-
ment and the guerrillas was in itself necessarily the affirmative
expression of a political opinion.' 26
Second, the Court explained that even assuming that Mr.
Elias-Zacarias possessed a political opinion, he would have to
prove that the guerillas' persecution was due to that political
opinion of neutrality, not due to Mr. Elias-Zacarias' refusal to
fight with the guerrillas.' 27 The Court concluded that Mr.
Elias-Zacarias had not established the connection between the
persecution and the political opinion of neutrality. 28
Third, the Court set out the burdens of proof required for
asylum applicants to gain eligibility for asylum and to overturn
a decision of the BIA. The Court held that Mr. Elias-Zacarias
need not provide direct proof of the persecutors' motives, but
that he must provide some evidence of it, either direct or cir-
cumstantial.' 29 The Court also explained that an asylum appli-
cant may obtain reversal of a BIA decision only if the applicant
is able to show that the evidence presented was so compelling
that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the necessary
fear of persecution.'3 0 The Court held that Mr. Elias-Zacarias
had not met that standard.' 3 ' Therefore, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision, explaining that the BIA's decision
should have been upheld.13 2
C. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun
125. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992). The Court's comments
indicate that if Mr. Elias-Zacarias had affirmatively expressed his opinion of neutral-
ity, he would have established the existence of a political opinion as required by the
Refugee Act. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 817. The Court explained that "Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot
be expected to provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We do not require
that. But since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it,
direct or circumstantial." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court did not provide any
further description as to the amount or type of evidence necessary to obtain asylum.
130. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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and O'Connor, described Justice Scalia's majority opinion as a
"narrow, grudging construction" of the Act. 133 The dissenters
argued that Mr. Elias-Zacarias' decision to remain neutral was
a political statement.1 4  The dissent further argued that the
persecutors' threat against the applicant was on account of that
political opinion. 135
The dissent conceded that the asylum applicant's expres-
sion of his opinion may not have been "elegant[ ]," but argued
that the Refugee Act does not require such an explicit and
well-developed expression of the opinion.' 36 The dissent cited
the Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca to show that the lan-
guage of the Act, the legislative history, and the U.N. Protocol
place a more relaxed burden of proof on asylum-seekers than
the majority required in its opinion. 37 The dissent, moreover,
133. Id. at 818 (arguing that majority opinion "is inconsistent with the basic ap-
proach to this statute that the Court endorsed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca") (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id.. The dissent stated that
[a] political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as affirmatively. A
refusal to support a cause-by staying home on election day, by refusing to
take an oath of allegiance, or by refusing to step forward at an induction
center-can express a political opinion as effectively as an affirmative state-
ment or affirmative conduct. Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing
more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's fam-
ily, it is the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions of the
statute were intended to protect.
Id. The dissenters quote from Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th
Cir. 1985), to support their assertion that refusal was a political opinion. Id. In Bola-
nos-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit cited several Supreme Court cases in which conduct
was opinion. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1287 & n. 18; see, e.g., Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol on flag); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (civil rights march); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (arm band to protest Vietnam war); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) (assembly in front of state legislature); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing).
135. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 819 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissent, explaining that the guerrillas' reaction to the applicant's opinion was
persecution, asserted that
(i]t does not matter to the persecutors what the individual's motivation is.
The guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process of
those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their cause. They
are concerned only with an act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a
political opinion. Persecution because of that overt manifestation is perse-
cution because of a political opinion.
Id. (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1287).
136. Id. at 819 n.5.
137. Id. at 818-19.
INS v. ELIAS-ZACARIAS
explained that Congress intended asylum applicants to have
some flexibility in presenting their claims for asylum because
of the persecution they face if forced to return to their native
country. 3
8
The dissenters also emphasized that a finding of asylum
eligibility under the Act would not automatically entitle a refu-
gee to asylum because the Attorney General retains discretion
to deny asylum even to aliens who qualify as refugees. 39 In
conclusion, the dissent argued that the evidence supported a
finding by the Court of Appeals that the applicant faced perse-
cution on account of his political beliefs.'
40
III. ELIAS-ZACARIAS: A DEPARTURE FROM THE PAST
In Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court for the first time ad-
dressed the issue of asylum eligibility for those who object to
military service on the basis of political opinion.' 4 ' The Court
dramatically increased the burden of proof provided under the
Refugee Act, the U.N. Handbook, and previous Supreme Court
precedent by requiring that aliens who seek asylum based
upon their refusal to perform military service provide proof of
their persecutors' intent. 142 This unwarranted increase in the
burden of proof will have a devastating impact if applied to
other cases as indicated by the Supreme Court's vacating and
remanding of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Canas-Segovia. 4  The Elias-Zacarias stan-
dard should not extend beyond the realm of political asylum
because such an extension would be inconsistent with U.S. ob-
ligations under international agreements such as the 1951
138. Id. at 819.
139. Id. at 818-19. The dissent explained that
[t]he [House] Committee carefully considered arguments that the new defi-
nition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to the United
States and force substantially greater refugee admissions than the country
could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group comes
within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in the United States.
Id. at 817-818 n.4 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421, 444-45 (1987)).
140. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 820 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. See Arthur C. Helton, Justices Seem to Give INS The Benefit of the Doubt,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 38.
143. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded,
1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505
(9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
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Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 144
A. The Supreme Court's Approach in Elias-Zacarias Was Misguided
The Court's approach in Elias-Zacarias was misguided for
two reasons. First, the decision ignored the lower burden of
proof previously endorsed by the Supreme Court five years
earlier in Cardoza-Fonseca when the Court had stated that the
Refugee Act required asylum applicants only to show that they
reasonably and genuinely feared persecution. 4 5 Second, the
Court failed to utilize the U.N. Handbook which Congress and
the Court previously had determined to be crucial when inter-
preting the Refugee Act. 14 6
1. The Court Failed to Follow Cardoza-Fonseca
The Court's requirement in Elias-Zacarias that an asylum
applicant prove that his persecutor possessed an intent to per-
secute contradicts its earlier approach to asylum eligibility as
declared in Cardoza-Fonseca.'47 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court
had examined the "well-founded fear" standard, rejecting the
government's claim that the Refugee Act required an applicant
for asylum to prove it was "more likely than not" that persecu-
tion on account of political opinion would result; the Court
reached this conclusion because a lower burden of proof was
"more in keeping with Congress' intent."' 48  In Cardoza-Fon-
seca, the Court had held that an asylum applicant need only
prove a fear of persecution that is subjectively genuine and ob-
144. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (explaining that Elias-
Zacarias cannot be applied to other asylum categories besides political opinion with-
out violating international agreements).
145. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see infra notes 147-157 and
accompanying text (explaining that Court should continue to follow approach set out
in Cardoza-Fonseca).
146. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 167-174; see infra notes 158-175 and ac-
companying text (explaining importance of U.N. Handbook).
147. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987); see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (explaining Cardoza-
Fonseca and congressional intent).
148. 480 U.S. at 443-45; see In re Said-Barre, No. A24 798 187 (BIA Apr. 15,
1988) (explaining that "an applicant does not bear the unreasonable burden of estab-
lishing the exact motivation of a 'persecutor' where different reasons for actions are
possible"); accord In re Ahmed, No. A24 798 181 (BIA June 10, 1988). The BIA has
also stated this rule in a published decision, although the Board rejected the appli-
cant's claim in that case. In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1988).
INS v. ELIAS-ZACARIAS
jectively reasonable.14 9 The Court elaborated on the "reason-
able" prong of the "well-founded fear" standard and stated
that reasonable fears may result from persecution that has
even a slight chance of occurring. 150 The Court stated that a
low standard of proof for asylum eligibility is necessary be-
cause a more restrictive standard of proof would remove the
broad discretion granted to the Attorney General to decide
asylum cases on an individual and flexible basis. 15 1
In Elias-Zacarias, however, the Court decided that the asy-
lum applicant failed to provide any proof of his persecutor's
motive and failed to show he had a "well-founded fear" that
the guerrillas would persecute him due to his political opinion
of neutrality rather than due to a refusal to fight.15 2  The
Court's requirement in Elias-Zacarias that an applicant prove
the persecutor's intent goes beyond Cardoza-Fonseca's require-
ment of an objectively reasonable and subjectively genuine
fear. Under Elias-Zacarias, an alien facing persecution that has
only a slight chance of occurring would not be entitled to asy-
lum, a different result than the Court would have reached
under Cardoza-Fonseca. Under Elias-Zacarias, the alien faces the
additional and unwarranted obstacle of proving intentional
persecution.
As the dissent in Elias-Zacarias indicated, the Refugee Act
requires only that an applicant show a "well-founded" fear of
persecution.'"5 If there exists even a "reasonable possibility"
that an asylum applicant will be prosecuted, the applicant has
met this burden.' 54 Therefore, the Supreme Court should not
pose the additional obstacle of requiring the applicant to pro-
149. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 434 (1987); see U.N. HANDBOOK,
supra note 14, 42 (explaining that "the applicant's fear should be considered well-
founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his
country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the defini-
tion, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there"); Arthur C.
Helton, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic: Standards of Proof in Refugee
Cases Involving Political Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 787,
800-08 (1985) (explaining that "well-founded fear" standard requires only that appli-
cant's fear be genuine and reasonable under circumstances). See supra notes 10-13
and accompanying text.
150. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
151. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444-45.
152. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
153. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 819.
154. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987); see also Cardoza-Fon-
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vide proof of the persecutor's intent.' 55 By requiring an asy-
lum applicant to provide proof of a persecutor's intent, the
Court has altered the flexible approach to asylum law that it set
out in Cardoza-Fonseca.156 Forcing asylum applicants to provide
proof of motive unnecessarily departs from Cardoza-Fonseca's
less stringent requirements. 157
2. The Court Failed to Utilize the U.N. Handbook and the
IRO Manual
In the Elias-Zacarias decision, the Supreme Court failed to
abide by, or even consider, the U.N. Handbook, despite con-
gressional intent and the importance of the document in prior
Supreme Court precedent.'5 8 By passing the Refugee Act of
1980, Congress intended to place the United States in compli-
ance with the U.N. Protocol.' 5 9 Because the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees relies on its Handbook to measure ad-
herence to the U.N. Protocol, 6 ° Congress also intended U.S.
courts to utilize the U.N. Handbook to interpret the Refugee
Act.' 6 ' The Supreme Court had previously found the U.N.
Handbook to provide significant guidance, but in Elias-Zacarias
the Court did not refer to it at all.' 62 If Elias-Zacarias signals a
seca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The Ninth
Circuit said that
if documentary evidence is not available, the applicant's testimony will suf-
fice if it is credible, persuasive, and refers to "specific facts that give rise to
an inference that the applicant has been or has good reason to fear that he
or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds."
Id. (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)).
155. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992).
156. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text (describing approach in Cardoza-Fonseca).
157. See supra note 151 (explaining low standard of proof required of asylum
applicants).
158. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
159. 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No. 6577. In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Supreme Court described Congress' intent by asserting that
[ilf one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of
'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
1967 United Nations Protocol ....
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37.
160. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 169-174.
161. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress in-
tended that courts use U.N. Handbook when interpreting Act).
162. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987). The
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departure from use of the U.N. Handbook, the Court has aban-
doned a valuable resource that it has used in the past to inter-
pret the Refugee Act. 163
Under the U.N. Handbook, Elias-Zacarias would be analyzed
under the provisions for aliens who refuse to serve in the mili-
tary because of a political opinion."'4 Those provisions permit
the asylum applicant to present evidence that the military ac-
tion which the applicant opposes was contrary to the basic
rules of human conduct.' In disregarding the U.N. Handbook,
the Supreme Court did not consider that Mr. Elias-Zacarias de-
sired to remain neutral in a civil battle that the international
community might condemn. 66 Moreover, the U.N. Handbook
recognizes that aliens should be granted latitude when they
present asylum claims because of the overwhelming difficulties
they face.' 67  In fact, the U.N. Handbook specifically says that
asylum applicants should be given the "benefit of the
doubt."' 168 Thus, the Court deprived Mr. Elias-Zacarias an op-
portunity to present a compelling case of fear of persecution
and subsequent right to asylum because of its stricter proof
requirements. 169
Court has stated that "the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the
Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful
in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes." Id. (citing McCul-
len v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992).
163. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
164. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that punishment for
refusal to serve in military action which international community condemns as con-
trary to basic rules of human conduct can be grounds for asylum).
165. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 171.
166. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
167. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 203 (explaining that "it is hardly pos-
sible for a refugee to 'prove' every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a require-
ment the majority of refugees would not be recognized"). The U.N. Handbook, ex-
panding on the connection between the victim's opinion and his persecution, ex-
plains that
[w]hile the [Protocol's] definition speaks of persecution "for reasons of
political opinion" it may not always be possible to establish a causal link
between the opinion expressed and the related measures suffered or feared
by the applicant. Such measures have only rarely been based expressly on
"opinion." . . . It will, therefore, be necessary to establish the applicant's
political opinion, which is at the root of his behaviour, and the fact that it
has led or may lead to the persecution that he claims to fear.
Id. 81.
168. Id. 203.
169. See Brief for Respondent, at 29, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812
1301
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Moreover, the Court's decision contravenes the IRO Con-
stitution, as illustrated through the IRO manual.170 The man-
ual, used by officers determining asylum eligibility, implements
the goals of the IRO Constitution.' 7 ' Unlike the Elias-Zacarias
decision, the manual does not require asylum applicants to
provide proof of the persecutor's intent. 172 The Court should
have utilized the IRO Constitution because when Congress
passed the Refugee Act, it intended to follow the 1951 Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol, documents that incorporated the
IRO definition of refugee. 73  The Court's decision to require
that the asylum applicant provide proof of the persecutor's in-
tent fails to accommodate the principles of the IRO Constitu-
tion, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol that funda-
mental human rights must be protected and that applicants for
asylum need prove only that their fears of persecution are rea-
sonable. 174 As a result, Elias-Zacarias bypasses Congress' intent
that the Refugee Act place the United States into compliance
with these international agreements. 71
B. The Implications of Elias-Zacarias
Elias-Zacarias affects U.S. asylum law in two ways. First,
(1992). The attorney for Mr. Elias-Zacarias argued that evidence could be provided
to show that the level of violence used by the guerrillas was at a level condemned by
the international community. The attorney stated that
[Zacarias] would submit evidence that the Guatemalan guerrillas kill people
in retaliation for their refusal to join the guerrilla movement. In this regard,
the State Department's country reports on human rights and newspaper ar-
ticles have documented that the Guatemalan guerrillas forcibly recruit rural
villagers and use extreme violence against those who oppose their revolu-
tionary movement.
Id.
170. IRO MANUAL, supra note 16, at 24, 19.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining requirements of
IRO Manual).
173. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, at 152; 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, at 6224;
IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § Cl(a)(i), 62 Stat. 3037. See supra notes 14-23 and
accompanying text (explaining interplay of IRO Constitution, 1951 Convention, and
1967 Protocol).
174. See, e.g., IRO MANUAL, supra note 16, at 24 (explaining that applicants need
only present "a plausible and coherent account" of why he fears persecution).
175. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 160; see supra notes 36 and 41 and accompanying text (explaining that
Congress passed Refuge Act to place United States into compliance with 1967 Proto-
col and 1951 Convention).
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the Court's new standard of proof forces aliens who seek asy-
lum based on political opinion to provide some proof of their
persecutors' intent.' 76  This new standard forces aliens to
show that their persecutors intended the prospective or actual
punishment on account of the aliens' opinions rather than
their refusal to serve.' 77 Second, the Court casts doubt on the
viability of asylum claims based on a political opinion of neu-
trality by stating that a refusal to serve on either side of a do-
mestic war is not necessarily the expression of an opinion.' 7 8
1. The Court Should Not Require Proof
of Persecutors' Intent
The Court's requirement that aliens provide evidence of
their persecutors' intent severely limits the asylum eligibility of
aliens who are political conscientious objectors and those who
wish to remain neutral in a particular military action. 179 Prior
to Elias-Zacarias, U.S. courts had followed the U.N. Handbook's
mandate that those who had been punished or faced imprison-
ment for refusing to serve in a particular military action could
obtain asylum if the military action at issue was condemned by
the international community as contrary to the basic rules of
human conduct. 8 " Under Elias-Zacarias' requirement that an
alien prove his persecutor's intent, political conscientious ob-
jectors will not be able to gain asylum because the nature of
the aliens' claims lies in their own personal objection to war-
fare rather than any intent on the part of the persecutor.' 8 '
176. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992).
177. Id. at 817; see supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing Court's
requirement that asylum applicant provide proof of persecutor's motive).
178. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816; see infra notes 191-201 and accompanying
text (arguing that remaining neutral is expression of political opinion).
179. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 196. The U.N. Handbook explains that
although the burden of proof is on the asylum applicant,
an applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary
other proof .... In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have
arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal
documents.... [I]f the applicant's account appears credible, he should, un-
less there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the
doubt.
Id.
180. See M.A. A26851062 v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990); see
also supra notes 82-87 (describing opinion in M.A.).
181. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (defining and describing political
conscientious objection).
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Moreover, courts have stated that the Refugee Act does
not require proof of the persecutor's intent or motive.'
Under the Court's holding in Elias-Zacarias, asylum applicants
face the additional burden of proving that the persecutor in-
tended to punish them because of religion, political opinion,
or one of the remaining three protected categories in the Refu-
gee Act.'8 3 Such a requirement contradicts the statutory lan-
guage that requires only that the applicant prove a "well-
founded" fear. 18 4 The requirement also contradicts Cardoza-
Fonseca's mandate that an alien need only show that the fear of
persecution is objectively reasonable and subjectively genu-
ine. 185 Moreover, the decision in Elias-Zacarias contradicts the
Refugee Act's main goal of providing refuge to those aliens
facing persecution for their political beliefs. 8 6
2. The Court Should Allow Neutrality to Serve as Opinion
The Supreme Court asserted that refusing to serve in
either side during a domestic war is not necessarily the expres-
sion of political opinion.' 87 The Court did not settle this issue
because it found that, regardless of whether Mr. Elias Zacarias
had expressed an opinion through neutrality, the persecution
was not on account of that opinion. 88 Therefore, the Court
182. See, e.g., Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 726 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated
and remanded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
183. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing Court's requirement
that asylum applicant provide proof of persecutor's intent).
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
185. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1987).
186. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984) (describing Congress' ihtent on
burdens of proof). H.R. REP No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 17-18 (1979). See S.
CONF. REP No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980); 126 CONG. REC. 4500 (1980)
(explaining that Congress intended to "insure a fair and workable asylum policy
which is consistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other
nations and with [the United States'] obligations under international law") (state-
ment of Rep. Holtzman, co-sponsor of House bill);
187. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992); see supra note 125 and
accompanying text (explaining that Court's comments indicate that if Mr. Elias-
Zacarias had affirmatively expressed his opinion of neutrality, he would have estab-
lished the existence of political opinion as required by the Refugee Act). However,
the existence of a political opinion provides asylum eligibility only if the persecution
is on account of that opinion. 112 S. Ct. at 816; see supra note 124 and accompanying
text (explaining Court's holding that, assuming political opinion existed, persecution
was not on account of opinion).
188. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
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found that it did not need to decide whether Mr. Elias-Zacarias
held a political opinion.18 9
The Court should have settled this issue so that lower U.S.
courts could maintain a consistent approach to U.S. asylum
law.' 9 ' Instead, the Court has failed to provide a clear stan-
dard to evaluate the asylum claims of aliens seeking refuge in
the United States. As a result, lower courts will reach conflict-
ing results. The Court should not only clarify its holding, but
it should also follow the dissent's acceptance of neutrality as
political opinion. As the dissent in Elias-Zacarias indicated,
neutrality has always been considered to be the expression of
an opinion under First Amendment jurisprudence in the
United States.' 9' The Court has held that refusals to support a
cause, for example by refusing to take an oath or to pledge
allegiance to a flag, are expressions of an opinion.' 92 Prior to
Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit had held that political neutral-
ity constituted a political opinion under the Refugee Act.' 93
However, under Elias-Zacarias the Court has suggested a new
approach such that neutrality, without any additional expres-
sion, may not constitute a political opinion under the Refugee
Act.' 94 Such a result contradicts Congress' intent to provide a
haven for those fearing persecution. 1 5 This more restrictive
approach to asylum law also violates the U.N. Handbook's re-
peated warnings that aliens will usually have difficulty proving
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 957 (1985) (stating that function of Supreme
Court is to "secure harmony of decision and the appropriate settlement of questions
of general importance") (emphasis in original) (quoting Hughes, Address of the Chief Jus-
tice, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 313, 315 (1934) (emphasis added)); SAMUEL ESTREICHER &JOHN
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FED-
ERAL JUDICIARY PROCEss 48 (1986) (stating that Supreme Court "is responsible for
maintaining the uniformity of federal law"). See SuP. CT. R. 17(a) (stating that when
considering writ of certiorari, Court should consider whether federal courts of appeal
are split on issue); see also ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 16, 113, 114 (1976).
191. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that political opin-
ions can be expressed by refusals to act).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (describing holding in Arnaga-Barrientos).
194. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
195. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text (explaining that aliens
should have broad eligibility for asylum).
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their claims and should be given the benefit of the doubt. 96
C. The Potential Effects of Elias-Zacarias
Elias-Zacarias will have a dramatic and potentially disas-
trous impact on U.S. immigration law when U.S. courts apply it
in cases beyond those involving persecution on account of
political opinion. Shortly after Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Canas-Segovia
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Elias-Zacarias.19 7 On remand, the Ninth Circuit was compelled
by Elias-Zacarias to find that an asylum applicant who claimed
religious persecution due to his refusal to serve in the military
on religious grounds had not provided evidence of his perse-
cutor's intent.' 98 As a result, asylum could not be granted on
that theory.' 99 If the holding and approach in Elias-Zacarias
continues to be followed in other contexts, as it was in the
Canas-Segovia decision on remand, the United States will abro-
gate its international obligations. 20 0 In addition, Elias-Zacarias
will make asylum nearly impossible to obtain in contexts in
which Congress intended aliens to obtain refuge.2° '
1. The Standards of Proof Established in Elias-Zacarias
Contradict U.S. Obligations Under International
Law
In passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress intended to
comply with the IRO Constitution, 1951 Convention, the 1967
Protocol, and the U.N. Handbook.20 2 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the
196. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing U.N. Handbook's leni-
ent standard of proof for asylum applicants).
197. INS v. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded,
1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th
Cir. July 10, 1992).
198. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505, at *2-3 (9th Cir. July
10, 1992).
199. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, granted asylum on the theory that Mr.
Canas-Segovia faced persecution on account of political opinion falsely imputed to
him. Id. at *4-5.
200. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. obligations
under U.N. treaties).
201. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (describing how Court se-
lected category under Refugee Act which poses great burden of proof).
202. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 160; see supra notes 36 and 41 and accompanying text (explaining Con-
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Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' intent to comply with
these international sources. 20 3 Yet, in Elias-Zacarias none of
these documents was utilized and the Court's decision violates
these international agreements.
Other signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol follow the approach described in the U.N. Handbook
rather than the more limited approach of requiring proof of
the persecutor's intent as stated in Elias-Zacarias. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties204 dictates that when inter-
preting a treaty, nations should consider the subsequent ac-
tions of other signatories as guidance. 0 5 The approach to asy-
lum advocated in the U.N. Handbook, and the related interna-
tional agreements has been followed in Germany, the
Netherlands, Canada, and Austria.2 °6 These countries have
maintained a low standard of proof for persons seeking asylum
when facing punishment for persecution on account of religion
or political opinion.20 7 To uphold basic principles of interna-
tional law, the U.S should follow the U.N. Handbook, the 1951
Convention, and the 1967 Protocol in a similar way.
gress passed Refuge Act to place United States into compliance with 1967 Protocol
and 1951 Convention).
203. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
204. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The United States recognizes that the
Convention codifies international law binding on the United States. See, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Intro-
ductory Note to Part III (explaining that "Department of State has on various occa-
sions stated that it regards particular articles of the Convention as codifying existing
international law; United States courts have also treated particular provisions of the
Vienna Convention as authoritative"); see also Congressional Research Service, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., S. Pr. No. 98-205, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of
the United States Senate 41 (1984) (explaining that Vienna Convention "retains its sta-
tus as a primary source of international law concerning treaties, even for nonpar-
ties").
205. Vienna Convention, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (explain-
ing that "[t]here shall be taken into account . .. any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation").
206. See supra notes 32-35 (explaining approach of other countries).
207. Id.
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2. The Standards of Proof Established in Elias-Zacarias
Should Not Be Applied Beyond the Context of
Persecution on Account of Political
Opinion
The Court's requirement of proof of motive will pose
great difficulty for asylum applicants fleeing punishment for
failure to comply with a facially neutral conscription policy that
infringes on religion. When Elias-Zacarias is applied in the fu-
ture, it will make asylum eligibility nearly impossible for reli-
gious conscientious objectors like those in Canas-Segovia.2 08 In
Canas-Segovia, Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious faith pro-
hibited them from participating in any kind of military service,
applied for asylum due to persecution on account of reli-
gion.20 9 The Ninth Circuit originally followed the U.N. Hand-
book and granted asylum because the persecutors' conscription
law was the equivalent of persecution on account of religion.
The court found that even the facially neutral intent of recruit-
ing soldiers could, in effect, result in persecution.2 10 On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit found that, in light of Elias-Zacarias,
the asylum applicant needed to present some evidence of the
persecutor's motives. 2 11 The applicant was not able to provide
such evidence.21 2 In addition, the Ninth Circuit followed the
lead of the Supreme Court and failed to utilize the U.N. Hand-
book. 213
Canas-Segovia would have been decided differently under
the U.N. Handbook, rather than under Elias-Zacarias. Under the
U.N. Handbook, aliens seeking asylum for refusal to serve in the
military on account of religion need only show that their reli-
208. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Political Asylum Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at A20 (writing that "[o]n the basis of today's ruling, the Court
is likely to overturn [Canas-Segovia]"); see also Nat Hentoff, 40 More Years of Clarence
Thomas, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 3, 1992, at 24-25 (explaining that Elias-Zacarias will
"affect thousands of people from Central America, Asia, and other places who want
to take refuge here from political retaliation that can lead to death or imprison-
ment").
209. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and re-
manded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
210. Id. at 728.
211. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505, at *2-3 (9th Cir. July
10, 1992).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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gious beliefs have not been taken into account by the authori-
ties. 21 4 The applicant need not demonstrate the persecutor's
motive or intent to harm.215 The relevant inquiry should be
the effect of the forced conscription on the applicant and
whether the applicant's religious beliefs have been "taken into
account. ' 216 Moreover, the U.N. Handbook requires the United
States to decide any ambiguity in favor of the alien.21 7 When
applying Elias-Zacarias to Canas-Segovia, the Ninth Circuit found
that the asylum applicant facing a facially neutral conscription
policy had not demonstrated an intent to persecute. This re-
sult does not comport with U.S. international obligations as set
out in the U.N. Handbook. Even the U.S. Solicitor General has
argued that the decision in Elias-Zacarias should not control
Canas-Segovia.2 1s Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded
214. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 172 (stating that "[i]f an applicant is able
to show that his religious convictions are genuine, and that such convictions are not
taken into account by the authorities of his country in requiring him to perform mili-
tary service, he may be able to establish a claim to refugee status").
215. Id. 167-74.
216. See supra notes 55-74 (discussing Ninth Circuit's approach in Canas-Segovia).
217. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing U.N. Handbook's low
standard of proof).
218. See Petition for Certiorari at 9, n.3, INS v. Elias-Zacarias (90-1342). The
Solicitor General argued that
[like this case, Canas-Segovia raises an important question of the meaning of
"on account of" in the Refugee Act. But the issues are in substantial re-
spects significantly different-here, the significance of the political objec-
tives of a guerilla group and in Canas-Segovia the significance of the con-
script's conscientious objection to government-required military service-
that we believe both decisions warrant plenary review. Moreover, a decision
in either case would not necessarily govern disposition of the other case.
Id. This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's remand of Canas-Segovia. 902
F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1260 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992); see Reply
Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Certiorari at 4, n.2, INS v. Elias-Zacarias 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992). The Solicitor General also argued that
[t]he lower court's reliance on the political motivation for the guerrillas'
threat does serve to distinguish this case from INS v. Canas-Segovia ....
The Ninth Circuit there held that, in the circumstances of government re-
cruitment of a conscientious objector, asylum eligibility does not require any
proof of the alleged persecutor's motivation. Here, on the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit did look to the persecutor's motivation but then held that
proof of motive to persecute an individual "on account of... political opin-
ion"is satisfied by evidence of the alleged persecutor's political motivation.
Thus, the reversal of the judgment in Canas-Segovia would not necessitate
the reversal of the judgment in this case. We therefore urge the Court to
grant the petition here as well as in Canas-Segovia.
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Canas-Segovia for reconsideration in light of Elias-Zacarias, indi-
cating that the holding of Elias-Zacarias should be extended be-
yond the context of persecution on account of political opin-
ion. In fact, the Ninth Circuit specifically found that the re-
quirement of proof of intent was not limited to persecution
based on political opinion, but applied to the other categories
of the Refugee Act, including religion. 1 9
These events are troubling because, in Elias-Zacarias, the
Court addressed a broad area of U.S. asylum law and articu-
lated new standards of proof by deciding a case involving the
Refugee Act category that poses the greatest difficulty for asy-
lum applicants. Under the Act, aliens who fear persecution
due to political opinion or religion are eligible for asylum. 2
However, the courts have recognized three different categories
of cases involving aliens seeking asylum after facing punish-
ment for refusal to join the military. First, aliens may refuse
military service because their religion forbids such violent ac-
tivity.22t Second, aliens may refuse military service based on
political conscientious objection.222 Finally, in limited circum-
stances an alien may refuse to serve in the military of the gov-
ernment or guerrillas because of a political opinion of neutral-
ity. 2
23
The final category of cases, involving a political opinion of
neutrality, poses the most difficult standard of proof of the
three categories for two reasons. First, the applicant may have
difficulty demonstrating that the punishment is for the opinion
rather than the refusal to serve because the applicant may not
have articulated an opinion. 22 4 As a result, asylum applicants
will have more difficulty meeting the Cardoza-Fonseca require-
ments that the fear of persecution be subjectively genuine and
Id. (citations omitted). The Court granted certiorari in both cases, but decided Elias-
Zacarias first and then remanded Canas-Segovia in light of Elias-Zacarias.
219. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15505 (9th Cir. July 10,
1992).
220. See 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (1988).
221. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (describing approach to reli-
gious conscientious objector cases).
222. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (explaining objection to mili-
tary service because of political conscientious objection).
223. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (describing U.N. Handbook's
approach).
224. Id. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining difficulty that ap-
plicants face in providing evidence of their claims).
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objectively reasonable." 5 Second, because aliens with an
opinion of neutrality object to a particular war rather than war-
fare in general, the U.N. Handbook states that each nation re-
tains the discretion to grant or deny asylum on a case-by-case
basis.22
Faced with three possible categories that address the Ref-
ugee Act's applicability to those opposing military service, the
Court in Elias-Zacarias chose the third and most difficult cate-
gory to set out new standards of proof. Elias-Zacarias
presented the least compelling case for asylum because the ap-
plicant's only expression of an opinion was his refusal to serve
with the anti-government guerillas.2 7 Moreover, the applicant
presented no evidence that the guerrillas who threatened him
knew he had an opinion; it is likely that the threats against him
were due only to his refusal to serve. 28 Unfortunately, the
Court chose to decide Elias-Zacarias and to remand Canas-Sego-
via, rather than give both cases a full hearing.22 9 The new
Elias-Zacarias requirement that an applicant present proof of
the persecutor's motive would make it nearly impossible for
aliens to obtain asylum under other categories of cases. This
result contradicts the Refugee Act, violates several interna-
tional agreements, and ignores Congress' intent to institute an
asylum policy that would provide sanctuary for oppressed peo-
ple around the world.2 3 0 Due to the Supreme Court's chang-
ing approach to asylum law and its refusal to follow its own
precedent in Cardoza-Fonseca, Congress should clarify its inten-
tion by passing further legislation in this area.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias marks a de-
225. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (describing proof require-
ments under Cardoza-Fonseca).
226. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 171.
227. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
228. Id. at 816.
229. Compare INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992) with INS v. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and re-
manded, 1992 U.S. LEXIS (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992), on remand, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
15505 (9th Cir. July 10, 1992).
230. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 14, 196-97 (explaining that nations
should grant asylum applicants benefit of doubt because of difficulty in presenting
claims for asylum); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
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parture from Supreme Court precedent, international agree-
ments, the U.N. Handbook, and the congressional intent behind
the Refugee Act. Requiring an asylum applicant in cases like
Elias-Zacarias and Canas-Segovia to provide proof of the perse-
cutors' intent is an unwarranted change from the past and
poses an insurmountable burden of proof on aliens. For those
reasons, the approach in Elias-Zacarias should not be extended
in the future.
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